

Proceedings



ARES 2007

The Second International Conference on Availability, Reliability and Security

April, 10th - April, 13th 2007, Vienna University of Technology, Austria

SCHNISCHE HOCHSCHULE

In Cooperation with











IEEE Computer Society Conference Publications Operations Committee





CPOC Chair

Phillip Laplante Professor, Penn State University

Board Members

Mike Hinchey, Director, Software Engineering Lab, NASA Goddard Linda Shafet, Professor Emeritus, University of Texas at Austin Jeffrey Voas, Director, Systems Assurance Technologies, SAIC Thomas Baldwin, Manager, Conference Publishing Services (CPS)

IEEE Computer Society Executive Staff

David Hennage, Executive Director Angela Burgess, Publisher

IEEE Computer Society Publications

The world-renowned IEEE Computer Society publishes, promotes, and distributes a wide variety of authoritative computer science and engineering texts. These books are available from most retail outlets. Visit the CS Store at http://www.computer.org/portal/site/store/index.jsp for a list of products.

IEEE Computer Society Conference Publishing Services (CPS)

The IEEE Computer Society produces conference publications for more than 200 acclaimed international conferences each year in a variety of formats, including books, CD-ROMs, USB Drives, and on-line publications. For information about the IEEE Computer Society's Conference Publishing Services (CPS), please e-mail: tbaldwin@computer or telephone +1-714-821-8380. Fax +1-714-761-1784. Additional information about the IEEE Computer Society's Conference Publishing Services (CPS) can be accessed from our web site at: http://www.computer.org/cps.

IEEE Computer Society / Wiley Partnership

The IEEE Computer Society and Wiley partnership allows the CS Press Authored Book program to produce a number of exciting new titles in areas of computer science and engineering with a special focus on software engineering. IEEE Computer Society members continue to receive a 15% discount on these titles when purchased through Wiley or at: http://wiley.com/ieeecs. To submit questions about the program or send proposals, please e-mail dplummer@computer.org or telephone +1-714-821-8380. Additional information regarding the Computer Society's authored book program can also be accessed from our web site at: http://www.computer.org/portnl/pages/ieeecs/publications/books/about.html.

Revised: 11 August 2006



New CPS Online Workspace

An IEEE Online Collaborative Publishing Environment

We're proud to announce the launch of CPS Online, a new IEEE online collaborative conference publishing environment designed to speed the delivery of price quotations and provide conferences with anytime access to all of a project's publication materials during production, including the final papers. CPS Online's workspace gives a conference the opportunity to upload files through any Web browser, check status and scheduling on a project, make changes to the Table of Contents and Front Matter, approve editorial changes and proofs, and communicate with a CPS editor through discussion forums, chat tools, commenting tools and e-mail.

The following is the URL link to the CPS Online Publishing Inquiry Form: http://www.ieeeconfpublishing.org/cpir/inquiry/cps_inquiry.html



Published by the IEEE Computer Society 10662 Los Vaqueros Circle P.O. Box 3014 Los Alamitos, CA 90720-1314

IEEE Computer Society Order Number P2775 Library of Congress Number 2007922437 ISBN 0-7695-2775-2



256

The Second International Conference on Availability, Reliability and Security



DEXA

ARES 2007

10 - 13 April 2007

Vienna, Austria


In Cooperation with





Teomisons Universität Wien

Victoria University or Technology





OESTERREICHISCHE COMPUTER GESELLSCHAFT AUSTRIAN COMPUTER SOCIETY






Los Alamitos, California

Washington

Tokyo



All rights reserved.

Copyright and Reprint Permissions: Abstracting is permitted with credit to the source. Libraries may photocopy beyond the limits of US copyright law, for private use of patrons, those articles in this volume that carry a code at the bottom of the first page, provided that the per-copy fee indicated in the code is paid through the Copyright Clearance Center, 222 Rosewood Drive, Danvers, MA 01923.

Other copying, reprint, or republication requests should be addressed to: IEEE Copyrights Manager, IEEE Service Center, 445 Hoes Lane, P.O. Box 133, Piscataway, NJ 08855-1331.

The papers in this book comprise the proceedings of the meeting mentioned on the cover and title page. They reflect the authors' opinions and, in the interests of timely dissemination, are published as presented and without change. Their inclusion in this publication does not necessarily constitute endorsement by the editors, the IEEE Computer Society, or the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc.

IEEE Computer Society Order Number P2775 ISBN 0-7695-2775-2 ISBN 978-0-7695-2775-8 Library of Congress Number 2007922437

Additional copies may be ordered from:

IEEE Computer Society
Customer Service Center
10662 Los Vaqueros Circle
P.O. Ben 3014
Los Alamitos, CA 90720-1314
Tel: +1 800 272 6657
Fax: +1 714 821 4641
http://computer.org/cspress
csbooks@computer.org

445 Hoes Lane
P.O. Box 1331
Piscataway, NJ 68855-1331
Tel: + 1 732 981 0060
Fax: + 1 732 981 9667
http://shop.iooc.org/store/
customer-service@iooc.org

IEEE Service Center

IEEE Computer Society
Asia/Pacific Offfice
Watanabe Bidg., 1-4-2
Minami-Aoyama
Minato-ka, Tokyo 107-0062
JAPAN
Tel: +81 3 3408 3118
Fax: +81 3 3408 3553
tokyo.ofo@computer.org

Individual paper REPRINTS may be ordered at: <eeprints/accomputer.org>

Editorial production by Bob Werner Cover art production by Joe Daigle/Studio Productions Printed in the United States of America by The Printing House







Conference Publishing Services

http://www.computer.org/proceedings/

Table of Contents

Second International Conference on Availability, Reliability and Security (ARES 2007)

Message from the Organizing Committee	
Session 1: Trust Model & Trust Management	
Formalising Dynamic Trust Negotiations in Decentralised Collaborative e-Health Systems Oluwafemi Ajayi, Richard Sinnott, and Anthony Stell	3
Why Trust is Not Proportional to Risk	11
From Trust to Dependability through Risk Analysis	19
Dynamic Trust Domains for Secure, Private, Technology-assisted Living	27
A Hybrid Trust Model for Enhancing Security in Distributed Systems	35
A Reliable Component-based Architecture for E-Mail Filtering	43
Session 2: Availability, Fault-Tolerant & Recovery	
Availability and Performance of the Adaptive Voting Replication Protocol	53
Distributed Stream Processing Analysis in High Availability Context	61
Implementing Network Partition-aware Fault-tolerant CORBA Systems	69
Failure Recovery in Cooperative Data Stream Analysis	77
A Recovery Protocol for Middleware Replicated Databases Providing GSI	85
Revisiting Hot Passive Replication	93

Session 3: Reputation Management & Trust Sini Ruohomaa, Lea Kutvonen, and Eleni Koutrouli Compartmented Security for Browsers — Or How to Thwart a Phisher with Sebastian Gajek, Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi, Christian Stüble, and Marcel Winandy Session 4: Privacy & Access Control Oliver Jorns, Oliver Jung, and Gerald Quirchmayr Christin Groba, Stephan Groß, and Thomas Springer Session 5: Failure Detection & Attack Prevention A Failure Detection Service for Large-Scale Dependable Wireless Ad-Hoc and Intrusion Detection System for Signal Based SIP Attacks through Timed HCPN190 3G-WLAN Convergenge: Vulnerability, Attacks Possibilities and Security Muhammad Sher and Thomas Magedanz Meriam Ben Ghorbel, Mehdi Talbi, and Mohamed Mejri Near Optimal Protection Strategies against Targeted Attacks on the Core Node Frank Yeong-Sung Lin, Po-Hao Tsang, and Yi-Luen Lin.

Session 6: Authentication & Authorisation

Errors in Attacks on Authentication Protocols Anders Moen Hagalisletto	223
Effects of Architectural Decisions in Authentication and Authorisation Infrastructures	230
Vulnerability Analysis of EMAP — An Efficient RFID Mutual Authentication Protocol Tieyan Li and Robert Deng	238
Authentication Mechanisms for Mobile Agents	246
Using SAML and XACML for Complex Authorisation Scenarios in Dynamic Resource Provisioning	254
The state of the s	
Implicit Authorization for Accessing Location Data in a Social Context	263
Session 7: Security Algorithm & Framework	
Fingerprint Matching Algorithm Based on Tree Comparison Using Ratios of	272
Thursisingham Charlorasekaran and Bhavani Thursisingham	
A Reconfigurable Implementation of the New Secure Hash Algorithm	
Applications for Provably Secure Intent Protection with Bounded Input-Size Programs J. Todd McDonald and Alec Yasinsac	286
A Framework for the Development of Secure Data Warehouse Based on MDA	1335
Emilio Soler, Juan Trujillo, Eduardo Fernández-Medina, and Mario Plattini	294
Session 8: Software Security	
Design of a Process for Software Security	301
STEF: A Secure Ticket-based En-Route Filtering Scheme for Wireless Sensor Networks	310
A Secure Architecture for the Pseudonymization of Medical Data	318
Collection of Quantitative Data on Security Incidents	325
Session 9: Security Models	
Security Vulnerabilities in DNS and DNSSEC	335

Secure, Resilient Computing Clusters: Self-Cleansing Intrusion Tolerance with Hardware Enforced Security (SCIT/HES)	
Applying a Tradeoff Model (TOM) to TACT	351
A Pattern System for Security Requirements Engineering Denis Hatebur, Maritta Heisel, and Holger Schmidt	356
Security Requirements for a Semantic Service-oriented Architecture	366
Supporting Compliant and Secure User Handling — A Structured Approach for In-House Identity Management	374
Session 10: Miscellaneous Security Techniques	
The Eventus Seeberg and Sissoodan Petrovic	385
Static Evaluation of Certificate Policies for GRID PKIs Interoperability	391
Towards an Ontology-based Risk Assessment in Collaborative Environments Using the SemanticLIFE	400
Universally Composable Three-party Key Distribution	408
Session 11: eAuction & eVoting Protocol	
An Efficient eAuction Protocol	417
Enhancing the Security of Local Danger Warnings in VANETs — A Simulative Analysis of Voting Schemes	422
and some state of the state of	
A Practical Verifiable e-Voting Protocol for Large Scale Elections over a Network Orhan Cetinkaya and Ali Doganaksoy	432
Session 12: Dependability in Distributed & Ubiquitous Comput	ing
Decoupling Constraint Validation from Business Activities to Improve Dependability in Distributed Object Systems	443
Dependability Aspects of Ubiquitous Computing	451
Concurrency Control Using Subject- and Purpose-Oriented (SPO) Scheduler	454

Session 13: Anomaly & Intrusion Detection Oleksiy Mazhelis and Seppo Puuronen Surekha Mariam Varghese and K. Poulose Jacob D.M. Akbar Hussain International Symposium on Frontiers in Availability, Reliability and Security (FARES) Session 1: Fault-Tolerant & Availability Prabhu S. and Venkat R. Yanlong Wang, Zhanhuai Li, and Wei Lin-Fault-Tolerant Semi-Passive Coordination Protocol for a Multi-Actuator/Multi-Sensor Model 506 Kelli Ozaki, Nachiro Hayashibara, Tomoya Enokido, and Makoto Takizawa Session 2: Access Control Franz Kollmann Vipin Singh Mewar, Subhendu Aich, and Shamik Sural Joaquín G. Alfaro, Frédéric Cuppens, and Nora Cuppens-Boulahia Session 3: Authentication Arjan Durresi, Vamsi Paruchuri, Mimoza Durresi, and Leonard Barolli Broadcast Authentication Protocol with Time Synchronization and Quadratic Residues Chain 550 Boodan Groza A Secure Key Exchange and Mutual Authentication Protocol for Wireless Mobile Yijun He, Nan Xu, and Jie Li Gang Yao, Dengguo Feng, and Xiaoxi Han

Session 4: Real-Time System & Sensor Network Adaptation Mechanisms for Survivable Sensor Networks against Denial of Dong Seong Kim, Chung Su Yang, and Jong Sou Park Christian Buckl, Matthias Regensburger, Alois Knoll, and Gerhard Schrott. Bastian Preindl and Alexander Schatten Session 5: RFID Techniques & Applications RFID Security Issues in Military Supply Chains..... Qinghan Xiao, Cam Boulet, and Thomas Gibbons The Cost of Preserving Privacy: Performance Measurements of RFID Jens Mache and Chris Allick Mobile Phone Based RFID Architecture for Secure Electronic Payments Using Geethapriya Venkataramani and Srividya Gopalan Session 6: Secure Solution & Applications C.M. Jayalath and R.U. Fernando

Security Oriented e-Infrastructures Supporting Neurological Research and

Thomas Neubauer, Gernot Goluch, and Bernhard Riedl

Session 8: Web, XML, Content Management

Secure Web Application Development and Global Regulation	681
Query Assurance Verification for Dynamic Outsourced XML Databases	689
A Reflection-based Framework for Content Validation	697
Session 9: Security Policies & Techniques	
Web Engineering Security: Essential Elements	707
Designing a Security Policy According to BS 7799 Using the OCTAVE Methodology Paulina Januszkiewicz and Marek Pyka	715
CSP-based Firewall Rule Set Diagnosis Using Security Policies	723
CASSIS — Computer-based Academy for Security and Safety in Information Systems Gernot Goluch, Andreas Ekelhart, Stefan Fenz, Stefan Jakoubi, Bernhard Riedl, and Simon Tjoa	730
Session 10: Trust Management & Trust Model	
Trust in Global Computing Systems as a Limit Property Emerging from Short Range Random Interactions	741
A Trust Overlay Architecture and Protocol for Enhanced Protection against Spam	749
HICI: An Approach for Identifying Trust Elements — The Case of Technological Trust Perspective in VBEs Simon Samwel Msanjila and Hamideh Afsarmanesh	757
A Semantic and Time Related Recommendation-Feedback Trust Model	765
Session 11: Miscellaneous Applications	
AsmLSec: An Extension of Abstract State Machine Language for Attack Scenario Specification	775
Error Modeling in RF-based Location Detection (EMLD) for Pervasive Computing Environments Niraj Swami and Sheikh I. Ahamed	783
A Performance Model to Cooperative Itinerant Agents (CIA): A Security Scheme to IDS	791

On the Assessment of the Interaction Quality of Users with Cerebral Palsy	799
Research and Design of Mobile Impeachment System with Semi-cryptonym	
Efficient Malicious Agreement in a Virtual Subnet Network	812
Second International Workshop Dependability Aspects on Data Warehousing and Mining Applications (DAWAM 2007)	•
Extended RBAC-Based Design and Implementation for a Secure Data Warehouse	
Application of QVT for the Development of Secure Data Warehouses: A Case Study Emilio Soler, Juan Trujillo, Eduardo Fernández-Medina, and Mario Piattini	
Protecting Private Information by Data Separation in Distributed Spatial Data Warehouse	
Applying a Flexible Mining Architecture to Intrusion Detection	
An Application of Learning Problem in Anomaly-based Intrusion Detection Systems Veselina G. Jecheva and Evgeniya P. Nikolova	
Detecting Critical Regions in Covert Networks: A Case Study of 9/11 Terrorists Network	861
Access Control and Integration of Health Care Systems: An Experience Report and Future Challenges	871
A Collaborative Inter Data Grids Strong Semantic Model with Hybrid Namespace Dalia El-Mansy and Ahmed Sameh	878
Reliability Markov Chains for Security Data Transmitter Analysis	886
2nd International Workshop Dependability and Security in e-Government (DeSeGov 2007)	
Requirements and Evaluation Procedures for eVoting	895
Towards Secure E-Elections in Turkey: Requirements and Principles	
On Coercion-Resistant Electronic Elections with Linear Work	
A Security Model and Architecture for Multichannel E-Government Systems MariaGrazia Fugini	917

925
eTVRA, a Threat, Vulnerability and Risk Assessment Method and Tool for eEurope
Framework for Information Sharing Across Multiple Government Agencies under
Dynamic Access Policies
Secure Distributed Dossier Management in the Legal Domain
Martin Warnier, Frances Brazier, Martin Apistola, and Anja Uskamp
Building a Dependable Messaging Infrastructure for Electronic Government
Workshop on Foundations of Fault-tolerant Distributed Computing
(FOFDC 2007)
A Universal Construction for Concurrent Objects
Rachid Guerraoui and Michel Raynal
FCPre: Extending the Arora-Kulkarni Method of Automatic Addition of Fault-Tolerance96' Bastian Braun
On the Implementation of the Omega Failure Detector in the Crash-Recovery 97
Failure Model
Self-Diagnosing Wireless Mesh and Ad-Hoc Networks Using an Adaptable
Comparison-Based Approach
Self-Stabilization as a Foundation for Autonomic Computing
On Programming Models for Service-Level High Availability
First International Workshop on Secure Software Engineering
(SecSE 2007)
Using Privacy Process Patterns for Incorporating Privacy Requirements into
the System Design Process
How Can the Developer Benefit from Security Modeling?
AProSec: An Aspect for Programming Secure Web Applications
Empirical and Statistical Analysis of Risk Analysis-Driven Techniques for Threat
Management
Secure Software Development through Coding Conventions and Frameworks
Takao Okubo and Hidehiko Tanaka

Pastures: Towards Usable Security Policy Engineering	1052
- At- C-registers the second control of the	
Sergey Bratus, Alex Pergusor, Dody Minney Security Objectives within a Security Testing Case Study Kaarina Karppinen, Reijo Savola, Mikko Rapeli, and Esa Tikkala	
CppTest: A Prototype Tool for Testing C/C++ Programs	
A Novel Approach to Building Secure Systems	
Workshop on "Modeling, Designing, and Testing Correct, Se	cure,
and Dependable Event-Based System" (EBITS 2007)	
Exception Handling in an Event-Driven System	
Issues in Testing Dependable Event-based Systems at a Systems Integration Company	
Optimizing Events Traffic in Event-based Systems by Means of Evolutionary Algorithms	
Event-based Monitoring of Open Source Software Projects	
Using Space-based Computing for More Efficient Group Coordination and Monitoring in an Event-based Work Management System	
Marcus Mor, Richard Mordinyi, and Schalling Schalling Street Stre	
First International Workshop on Advances in Information S (WAIS 2007)	ecurity
	1135
An Approach for Adaptive Intrusion Prevention Based on The Danger Theory	
A Human-Verifiable Authentication Protocol Using Visible Laser Light	
Insider-secure Hybrid Signcryption Scheme without Random Oracles	
ZeroBio — Evaluation and Development of Asymmetric Fingerprint Authentication System Using Oblivious Neural Network Evaluation Protocol Kei Nagai, Hiroaki Kikuchi, Wakaha Ogata, and Masakatsu Nishigaki	
Kei Nagai, Hiroaki Kikuchi, Wakana Ogalo, and Houston Trusted Operating Systems A Policy Language for the Extended Reference Monitor in Trusted Operating Systems Hyung Chan Kim, R.S. Ramakrishna, Wook Shin, and Koluchi Sakurai	

Analysis on Bleichenbacher's Forgery Attack	
A New Method for Reducing the Revocation Delay in the Attribute Authentication	75
Efficient Multiparty Computation for Comparator Networks	
Pseudo-Voter Identity (PVID) Scheme for e-Voting Protocols	
Attacks are Protocols Too	
Evaluation Function for Synthesizing Security Protocols by Means of Genetic Algorithms	
On the Use of One-Way Chain Based Authentication Protocols in Secure Control Systems	
Bypassing Data Execution Prevention on Microsoft Windows XP SP2	
A Security Framework for RFID Multi-Domain System	27
E-Learning 2.0 = e-Learning 1.0 + Web 2.0?	235
Blended Learning Technology in Information Security Management Courses	
Defining a Trusted Service-oriented Network Environment	
Designing a Cryptographic Scheme for e-Surveys in Higher-Education Institutions	251
Author Index 12	256

Message from the Organizing Committee

Security, Reliability and Availability of IT systems and infrastructures have for over two decades been core research areas in the field of IT Security. Recent strategic research foci, especially in the European Union, have renewed the interest in the area and are setting the stage for very interesting and challenging developments, in areas ranging from the use of IT for increasing security in general, to the security of critical IT infrastructures and legal, economic and social issues. That is why ARES 2007, like ARES 2006 before, is again designed to serve as a bridge and discussion forum for researchers and practitioners.

We are therefore very pleased to have this conference for a second time organised in cooperation with ENISA (The European Network and Information Security Agency). ENISA supports the idea of this conference due to the urgent need of scientific research and the dissemination of new techniques in these areas.

We hope that this years ARES conference will again have a significant benefit for innovative applications which have to consider the various dependability issues and furthermore will build a platform for in-depth discussions between researchers in the different areas of Dependability, such as Availability, Reliability, and Security.

We have received 212 competed, on time submitted papers amongst over 250 abstract submissions from 43 countries for ARES 2007 and the Program Committee eventually selected 59 papers, making an acceptance rate of 27,83 % of submitted papers.

Seven workshops are organised on special topics of ARES, i.e.-

- Workshop "Dependability Aspects on Data Warehousing and Mining applications" (DAWAM 2007)
- Workshop "Dependability and Security in e-Government" (DeSeGov 2007)
- Workshop "Foundations of Fault-tolerant Distributed Computing" (FOFDC 2007)
- Workshop "Secure Software Engineering" (SecSE 2007)
- Workshop "Modeling, Designing, and Testing Correct, Secure, and Dependable Event-Based System" (EBITS 2007).
- Workshop "Advances in Information Security" (WAIS 2007)
- Workshop: Security in E-Learning (SEL 2007)

As an additional feature of ARES we have invited distinguished scientists for the International Symposium on Frontiers in Availability, Reliability and Security (FARES) to present and discuss special aspects relevant for future applications and research. We would like to express our gratitude to all program committee members, workshop organisers and committee members and all the external referees who reviewed the papers very profoundly and in a timely manner. Due to the high number of submissions and the high quality of the submitted papers, the reviewing, and discussion process was an extraordinarily challenging task.

Special thanks must be given to Dr. Tho Manh Nguyen for all his essential support in the organization of the PC-tanks of ARES 2007. We would also like to thank all the authors who submitted their papers to ARES 2007 as their contributions built the basis of this year's excellent technical program. Many thanks go to Ms. Gabriela Wagner for her invaluable support with administrative issues.

Norman Revell, Middlesex University, United Kingdom Roland Wagner, University of Linz, Austria Honorary Co-Chairs

Günther Pernul, University of Regensburg, Germany Makoto Takizawa, Tokyo Denki University, Japan General Co-Chairs

Gerald Quirchmayr, University of Southern Australia, Australia

A Min Tjoa, Vienna University of Technology, Austria

Program Co-Chairs

A set of QVT relations to transform PIM to PSM in the Design of Secure Date Warehouses

Emilio Soler¹, Juan Trujillo², Eduardo Fernández-Medina³ and Mario Piattini³
(1) Departamento de Informática. University of Matanzas, Cuba
Autopista de Varadero km 3. Matanzas. Cuba.
esolercu@vahoo.es, http://www.umcc.cu

(2) Departamento de Lenguajes y Sistemas Informáticos. University of Alicante C/ San Vicente S/N 03690 Alicante, Spain jtrujillo@dlsi,ua.es, http://www.dlsi.ua.es

(3) Grupo ALARCOS, Departamento de Tecnologías y Sistemas de Información Centro Mixto de Investigación y Desarrollo de Software UCLM-Soluziona University of Castilla-La Mancha Paseo de la Universidad, 4 – 13071 Ciudad Real, Spain

[eduardo.fdzmedina, mario.piattini]@uclm.es, http://www.uclm.es

Abstract

Security represents a crucial aspect in the development of Data Warehouses (DWs), since they contain confidential data. It becomes therefore necessary to specify security and audit requirements for the multidimensional modelling, that cannot be directly transferred to the relational model of the DW. The standard framework for software development Model Driven Architecture (MDA) allows us to define transformations between models by proposing Ouery/View/Transformations (OVT). This proposal allows the definition of formal, elegant and transformations between unequivocal Independent Model (PIM) and Platform Specific Model (PSM). This paper employs OVT to establish a set of relations that allows us to transform security information embedded in the DW's multidimensional concentual model to a relational logical scheme.

1. Introduction

Organizations began to adopt more and more computerized information systems, which rely upon databases and data warehouses (DWs) that require increasingly more quality and security. DWs frequently store historical and aggregated information, extracted from multiple heterogeneous, autonomous and distributed information sources; therefore, the very survival of the organization depends on the appropriate

manipulation, security and confidentially information [1].

Relevant literature on this subject comprises as initiatives to include security in the DW design II many of them being focused on specific aspects to to access control, multilevel security, feder databases applications, commercial tools applicaetc. These proposals neither analyze security in all stages of the development cycle, nor introduce see in multidimensional conceptual design More within DW projects, the security aspects are norm implemented in final phases of design [6]. Howe information security is a serious requirement wa must be carefully considered, not as an issle aspect, but as an element which turns up as an i in all stages of the development lifecycle, I requirement analysis to implementation maintenance [7].

The new standard that addresses the complete lifecycle of developing applications by using now in software development is arising: Model Door Architecture (MDA) [8]. MDA has become a present standard for software development, have guided all the process by means of not transformations. Several proposals appeared in the layears to establish MDA transformations [9], not consequence, in April 2002 the Object Manager Group (OMG) consortium announced the 20 MO Query/Views/Transformations Request For Propositions the way to carry out transformations between

in wise languages have been defined using Meta of facility (MOF).

but we several proposals that try to integrate in with the MDA technology [10-13], but all of any sized to information systems, access control, by process and secure distributed applications, are mixed to the design of secure DWs. In [14] and propose an MDA oriented framework for integrated of DWs, but they do not consider to requirements. In [15-17] the authors cover security requirements in the process of transformal modeling, but still the transformation arms undefined until the development of the

The week proposes a set of QVT transformations to noteing of secure DWs and it can be seen as a contra of the work described in [15-17]. Our more a to establish a security data transformation on the conceptual and logical levels of DW transformation. The implementation of the rules transformation. The implementation of the rules transformation remains outside the scope to sork.

In set of this article is structured as follows.

In 2 presents the main aspects related to the MDA

Inches and the QVT transformations. A secure

Intersonal architecture MDA (Secure
Intersonal MDA) is introduced in section 3,

In set define a Secure Multidimensional Platform

Intersonal Platform Specific Model (SMD

Inter

WDA and Transformations QVT

A and of QVT transformations. For more details, of the transformations. For more details, of the transformations.

den for software development that considers the list primary artifact. MDA relies on the blobel and traditional idea to separate the along of a system's operations from the details a parlorn [8]. In this way, MDA promotes the reason of a Platform Independent Model (PIM) that not contain information specific to the term of to the technology used to develop it. This is to be transformed into one or several Platform and the Models (PSMs) by including platform and depond technology specific information. Later,

each PSM is implemented into code to be executed on a platform in order to obtain the final software product. In order to make the transformations from PIM to PSM, we considered the QVT declarative [18]. QVT offers two types of notations (graphical and textual) for defining transformations. A transformation is characterized by the following elements:

- Two or more domains: Each domain identifies a candidate model (i.e., the metamodels PIM or PSM), and a corresponding set of elements defined by means of patterns. A domain pattern can be considered a object template. Their properties and associations must be located, modified, or created in a candidate model in order to satisfy the relation.
- A relation domain: It specifies the type of relation between domains, and it can be marked like checkorly (labeled with C) or like enforced (labeled with E). A checkorly domain is verified to see if the model contains a valid correspondence that satisfies the relation. Meanwhile, in the case of an enforced domain, when the domain pattern does not correspond, the elements of the destination model can be created, deleted or modified to satisfy the relation. In addition, for each domain the name of the underlying metamodel is specified.
- The when clause: specifies the conditions that must be satisfied to execute the transformation (i.e. preconditions).
- The where clause: specifies the conditions that must be satisfied by all model elements involved in the relation (i.e., post-conditions).
- A transformation contains two types of relations: toplevel and non-top-level. The execution of a transformation requires the fulfillment of all top-level relations, whereas the non-top-level relations are required to be fulfilled only when they are very directly or transitively invoked from the where clause of another relation.

3. Secure Multidimensional MDA: SMD MDA

The security and audit rules specified at conceptual level in the process of DW multidimensional modeling cannot be directly represented in the relational model [19], but the metamodel need to be previously adapted with security aspects; therefore we are confronted with a semantic gap between the conceptual and logical schemes [6]. In this section we employ an MDA approach to cover this semantic gap by means of QVT transformations. The subsections 3.1 and 3.2 introduce the terms Secure Multidimensional PIM

(SMD PIM) and Secure Multidimensional PSM (SMD PSM) respectively.

The diagram present in Figure 1 illustrates a reduced approximation of the Secure Multidimensional MDA architecture. On the left hand side the Secure Multidimensional conceptual scheme, i.e., SMD PIM, is presented. By means of the transformation T1 we obtain the relational logical scheme, i.e., SMD PSM, represented in the centre of Figure 1. If we choose a SGBD that implements security aspects, then SMD PSM is transformed according to T2 into code for the target platform. This code is called the Secure Multidimensional Code (SMD Code), The Figure illustrates how the security constraint defined by means of Object Constraint Language (OCL) [15] (represented as an UML note) is transformed from the conceptual level to the logical level by employing T1, and later transformed into code with the T2 transformation.




Figure 1. General transformation scheme

3.1. Definition of the SMD PIM

The Unified Modeling Language (UML) profile presented in [17] and called Secure Data Warehouse (SECDW), allows us to represent the main security requirements for the conceptual modeling of DWs. Figure 2 represents the SECDW metamodel, although some attributes were omitted to make the metamodel more comprehensible.

As security requirements are modeled in this PIM, it is therefore denominated as SMD PIM (Secure Multidimensional PIM). The main characteristics of this metamodel are the many-to-many relations between facts and specific dimensions, degenerated dimensions, the multiple classifications and the alternative path of hierarchy, as well as non-strict and complete hierarchies. The UserProfile metaclass contains information on each user's right of access to the multidimensional model.

The metamodel also allows main security aspects for the modeling. For each element of SDegenerateFact, SDi SDegenerateDimension, SFac and SDimensionAt information is defined by m security levels (SecurityLev categories (SecurityCompartm roles (SecurityRoles), Addition security constraints (SConst security level and the rights accede to certain informati authorization rule (Authorization interdiction to specific use information. The access type c of certain attributes contained fact can be captured in the security rule (SecurityRule). If information for which his accu fact can be modeled with an These restrictions are defined u [20] and represented at model I associated to the corresponding

More details on this profile c




Figure 2. SECDW Metamod

3.2. Definition of the SMD P.

A platform specific model (P: from the perspective of the platf databases and data warehous modeling provides the PIM, and the PSM. In multidimensional r level is designed according to the the SGBD (Relational Online A ROLAP, Multidimensional Processing, MOLAP or Hybric sing HOLAP). Still, Kimball [21] assures that common representation is on relational

es, i.e., on ROLAP systems.

age 3 presents the SECRDW metamodel that be designated in the following as PSM. In order to sh the security aspects it comprises, it will be the Secure Multidimensional PSM (SMD PSM). this metamodel we can represent Tables, an, primary and foreign keys, etc. The Schema ing allows the security at model level. The reproperty and SecurityConstraint metaclasses esociated with the Table and Column metaclasses ctively, and they establish security for attributes ubles. In addition SecurityConstraint allows us to the constraints (AuditRule, AuthorizationRule SecurityRule) modeled through the UML notes in Secure DW (SECDW) metamodel, i.e., in PIM. purrofile metaclass specifies restrictions on other information corresponding to a user or user




Figure 3. SECDW Metamodel for the SMD PSM

B. QVT transformations of the SMD PIM to DMD PSM

We start by presenting the main transformations to gresent some top-level type relations. ections 3.3.1, 3.3.2 and 3.3.3 describe in detail relations are defined to establish the miformations between SMD PIM and SMD PSM. This will be illustrated by employing the graphical and testual notation provided by QVT. The attention will fecus on the security and audit requirements in order to make the transformation more comprehensible.

Transformation SMD To SREL(SMD: SECDW) SREL: SECROW) (key Table(name, Schoma); key Column (name, owner); key UserProfite(name, Schema): key PrimaryKey(name, owner); key Foreign Key(name, owner): key SecurityProperty(name, owner); key SecurityConstraint(name, owner); top relation SecureOW2Scheme() top relation UserProfile2RUserProfile() top relation SFact2Table () top relation SDegenerateFact2Table() top relation SDimension2Table() (Association SFact with SDimension top relation Assoc5F_D2FKey() //Association SDegenerateFact with SDimension top relation Assoc SDF_SD2FKeyFKey Il Association SDegenerateFact with SFact top relation AssocSDF_SF2FKey(i)

Figure 4. Textual notation for the SMDPIM to SMDPSM transformation

Figure 4 employs the textual notation to establish the main transformations, i.e., the SMD PIM to SMD PSM transformation. The keyword top preceding the relations specifies that those relations will never be invoked by other relations throughout transformation. Each one of these relations has its own when and where clauses corresponding pre and postconditions to be satisfied.

3.3.1 The SFact to Table transformation

Figure 5 illustrates the SFact2Table relation in its graphical notation. There is a table corresponding to SFact and having the same name. This table has a column with a name (specified in the where clause), which is also the primary key of the table. The security information represented with august solues in the SFact is transformed into objects associated to the table. This security information is modeled at logical level in the heading of the SFact table. The SFAct2Table relation is satisfied only when the pre-condition 25 SecureDW2Schema therefore ensuring that the table will be contained in Schema.




Figure 5. Transforming SFact into Table

The SFact attributes together with their security information and constrains are transformed according to the SFactAttribute2Column (see Figure 6) or SDegenerateDimension2Column relations, as it is the case. It should be noted that the last relation is never invoked because the scheme stars are only considered at logical level [21]. SFact contains tagged values that inherit security restrictions from SecureClass. These restrictions are transformed security SFactConstraint2SecurityConstraint security constraints of the entire table (see Figure 7). These restrictions are modeled using UML notes. In the following subsections, the SFactAttribute2Column and SFactConstraint2SecurityConstraint transformations are described in detail.

3.3.2. The SFactAttribute to Column transformation

Figure 6 shows the graphical notation for the SFactAttribute2Column relation. Each SFactAttribute inherits information and security restrictions from the SecureProperty class, as this contains the SConstraint this reason SFactAttribute2Column transforms not only attributes into columns, but also all the associated security information that SFActAttribute contains at conceptual level. This information is modeled at logical level next to each column of the table that represents the SFact. The relation that appears as post-condition transforms the security restrictions of each SFactAttribute into an object associated to the corresponding column. This object is modeled like an UML note associated to the column. It be: noted that the SMDTvpe2SRELTvpe() converts a data type of the initial metamodel (i.e., Secure Relational SECRDW).

SFactAtribute2Column

ccdontain>>

t: SFact

sta: SFactAtribute
name: n, sta
type= L, ste
SL SFA= a, st
SC_SFA= a, st
SC_SFA= a, sc

Where

SAtributeConstraint2SecurityConstraint (sta: n, st)
SRefType= SMDType2SRefType it, stat;
n, c= n, sta: c, st= a, st, c, st= a, st; c, st= a, s

Figure 6. Transforming SFactAttribute Init Column

3.3.3. The SFactConstraint to SecurityConstraint transformation

Let's assume that in the case of the SFactAttribute2Column relation, all the relations of the where clause have been defined. Returning to the content of the post-conditions that appear in SFact2table relation, we should now establish to SConstraint2SecurityConstraint transformation. Figure 7 contains the graphical notation provided by GM some attributes were omitted to make it may comprehensible.




Figure 7. Graphical notation for the SFactConstraint into SecurityConstraint transformation

When the SFactConstraint2SecurityConstraint than is applied, there is for each SConstraint (i.e., that sale, AuthorizationRule or SecurityRule) a presponding SecurityConstraint (that is to say, todicConstraint, ARConstraint or AURConstraint) of truble that represents the SFact logical level.

.4. The SMD PSM to MSD Code

The code is obtained using Oracle 9i like SGBD, isse it allows the design of secure databases and their relimentation with the component Oracle Label fearly (OLS) [22]. This component allows the production of security in databases by means of reficates and functions. These functions and redicates are called when an operation is executed; in its way the security value of the label is defined scording to the fulfillment of certain condition. SMD lode is the name attributed to the code generated with its transformation, because this code implements emity requisites.

L Applying QVT transformations – an

This section explains how the defined relations at applied. Considering for example that a hospital sistes to automate the process of patient admission, the type of information involved requires artifidentiality.




Figure 8. Example of modeling secure multidimensional

Figure 8 shows an instance of the SECDW metamodel, i.e., SMD PIM, to illustrate a part of the data warehouse that is required to answer the previous problem. The following levels of security are employed: confidential, secret, topSecret. The user roles can be Health (including Doctor and Nurse) and noHealth (including the roles Administrative and Maintenance). The root of this hierarchy is HospitalEmployee. In this example, the user categories were not considered. The SFact Admission contains all the individual patient admissions, and can be acceded by users who have security levels secret or topSecret and play an Administrative or Health role. The SDimension Patient contains information regarding the hospital patients and can be accoded by all the users who possess the secret security level and play Security roles. The SBase City contains information about cities, and it allows us to form groups of patients by

In each Admission instance the security level labeled as SL - can depend on the attribute cost that indicates the price of the admission service. This restriction is specified by means of a SecurityRule. The application of the main transformation (see Figure 4) in the case of this example begins with the application of the SecureDW2Schema relation that transforms the package Hospital into schema Admission, at the same values. tagged the defining UserProfile2RUserProfile relation guarantees that Schema contains a table whose columns correspond to the attributes of the UserProfile class. Figure 9 illustrates the result of applying the SFact2Table relation. The SFact Admission is transformed into the SAdmission table, which contains as primary key the and SR objects that specify the users who will have access to this type of information.

The SFactAttribute2Column relation appears in the where clause of the SFact2Schema relation. This relation transforms the attributes of the SFact Admission into columns of the Admission table; as you can see in Figure 9.




Figure 9. Transforming SFact into Table

If we continue with the relations that appear in the where clause of the SFact2Table, we should now apply the SFactConstraint2SecurityConstraint relation. Figure 10 presents a SecurityRule being transformed into an ARConstraint associated with the Admission table. It is to be noted the representation of the access levels previously transformed by means of SFact2Table in the table heading. Starting from Figure 10, it is now easy to obtain code for a secure platform like OLS [22].




Figure 10. SFactConstraint2SecurityConstraint Transformation

5. Conclusions and Future Work

This article has presented a set of MDA transformations employing standard QVT to transform a multidimensional conceptual model into a secure relational logical scheme. These transformations, together with the definitions of a PIM and of a Secure Multidimensional PSM (SMD PIM, SMD PSM) allow us to define a Secure Multidimensional MDA architecture. The greatest contribution of this work is that all the security and audit requirements are modeled at conceptual level from early development stages and through the

transformations they get nearer to the end us therefore the time and effort invested in development of DWs are shortened, the sent rules are closer to the end user and allow him obtain their corresponding code for a relate platform. Our immediate future work consists studying the possibility to represent by means of cases the security requirements of a DW, to cona secure Computation Independent Model (CIMiz establish. CIM secure transformations. Our long term intentions are study the possibility of implementing a h including the SMD PIM, the SMD PSM, the QVI transformations and the code generation process

Acknowledgements

This work has been partially supported by the METASIGN project (TIN2004-00779) from the Spanish Ministry of Education and Science, by the DADASMECA project (GV05/220) from the Region Government of Valencia, and by the DIMENSION (PBC-05-012-1) DADS project (PBC-05-012-2) from the Regional Science and Technology Ministry of Castilla -La Mancha (Spain).

References

- G. Dhillon and J. Backhouse, "Information systems security management in the new milenim," Communications of the ACM, vol. 43 (7), 2000.
- [2] R. Kirkgöze, N. Katic, M. Stolda, and A. M. Tjur, "A Security Concept for OLAP, 8th International Workshop on Database and Expert System Applications (DEXA'97)," Toulouse, France, 1997.
- [3] N. Katic, G. Quirchmayr, J. Schiefer, M. Stolba, and A. M. Tjou, "A Prototype Model for Data Warehouse Security Based on Metadata," presented at Ri. International Workshop on Database and Exper. Systems Applications (DEXA'98), Vienna, Auria, 1998.
- [4] T. Priebe and G. Pernul, "Towards OLAP Security Design - Survey and Research Issues.," presented at 2nd International Workshop on Design and Management of Data Warehouse (DMDWW), Sweden, 2000.
- [5] A. Rosenthal and E. Sciore, "View Security as the Basic for Data Warehouse Security," presented at Workshop on Design and Management of Data Warehouse (DMDW00), Sweden, 2000.
- [6] J. Hammer, M. Schneider, and T. Sellis, "Den Warehousing at the Crossroads," presented at Dagonial Perspectives Workshop, Dagsthul, Germany, 2004.
- [7] P. Devanbu and S. Stubblebine, "Software engineering for security: a roadmap," presented at The future of Software engineering, Limerick, Ireland, 2000.
- [8] J. Miller and J. Mukerji, "MDA Guide Version 101," 2003.

n. "Classification of Model ," presented at Proceedings Workshop on Generative at of The Model Driven

odderstedt, "Model Driven sdels to access control 14 - September 2003.

R. Raje, A. M. Olsen, and in Security: Unification of ne-Grain Access Control, 03.

LR.Karpagam, "A Novel ing Security services," wal. vol. 13, 2004.

penPMF: a Model-Driven Distributed Systems," recurity Solutions Europe y, 2004.

Serrano, and M. Piattini, development of data NLAP 2005, 2005.

illo, R. Villarroel, and M. nd audit model for the of data warehouses," vol. 42, pp. 1270-1289,

rujillo, RodolfoVillarroel, sg secure data warehouses ormation Systems, vol. In

illo, R. Villarroel, and M. or designing secure Data at 23rd International lodeling (ER04), Shangai,

Submission: MOF 2.0 is.," 2006.

Trujillo, E. Fernándezcepresenting security and ses at the logical level by se Metamodel," presented ference on Availability, RES'06), Vienna, Austria,

Piattini, "Extending OCL n," presented at Unified i), Eiséou, Potugue, 2884. The Data Warehousing iley, 2002. Security. Administrator's (2.