



# WOSIS 2013

## Security in Information Systems

David G. Rosado, Carlos Blanco, Daniel Mellado,  
Jan Jürjens and Luis Enrique Sánchez (Eds.)

Proceedings of WOSIS 2013

10th International Workshop on Security in Information Systems  
In conjunction with the 15th International Conference on Enterprise  
Information Systems - ICEIS 2013

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David G. Rosado  
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Angers, France, July 2013

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## Foreword

The Tenth International Workshop on Security in Information Systems – WOSIS 2013 was organized in conjunction with ICEIS 2013 in Angers, France. As in previous years, this workshop is primarily focused on high quality and innovative research papers from different fields related to the most recent developments in Security in Information Systems. In this edition, the workshop has incorporated new topics related to security in Cloud computing and Mobile Computing.

Traditionally the best papers are published in a reputable journal dealing with WOSIS topics. This year, authors will have the opportunity to have their work selected for publication in an extended version in the well recognized ISI ranked Publication Journal such as The Computer Journal. We especially want to thank Professor Fionn Murtagh for his outstanding support throughout the whole process in publishing the best WOSIS 2013 papers in The Computer Journal.

Papers presenting the most recent theoretical, and practical works in security for Information Systems were received, a total of 19 submissions. All the submissions were reviewed by at least two program committee members. Finally, 8 papers have been accepted and 2 short papers will also have the chance to be presented during the sessions due to the excellent quality of the research.

We would like to thank all the authors who took the time to submit papers to WOSIS, even though they were not finally accepted. We would also to express our gratitude for the excellent work done by the Program Committee and the members of the Organisation Committee.

The publication of the best papers in the prestigious journal of The Computer Journal, along with the presence of a renowned Program Committee, will contribute to the success of this 10th edition of WOSIS.

July 2013,

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# A Model Driven Approach for Automatically Improving OLAP Legacy Applications with Security

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**Abstract.** The majority of the organizations store its historical business information in Data Warehouses (DW) which are queried to make strategic decisions by using On-Line Analytical Processing (OLAP) tools. This information has to be correctly assured for unauthorized accesses, but nevertheless there are a great amount of legacy OLAP applications that have been developed without considering security aspects or these have been incorporated once the system was implemented. This work defines a reverse engineering process that allows us to obtain the conceptual model corresponding to a legacy OLAP application, and also analyses and represents the security aspects that could have established. This process has been aligned with a model driven architecture for developing secure OLAP applications by defining the transformations needed to automatically apply it. Once the conceptual model has been extracted, it can be easily modified and improved with security, and automatically transformed to generate the new implementation.

## 1 Introduction

The information stored in Data Warehouses (DWs) is organized by following a multidimensional model which improves its further analysis, usually carried out by using on-line analytical processing (OLAP) tools. In this way, the information is organized in facts and measures which can be analyzed by different subjects called dimensions and in different detail levels.

This information has a strategic value for the organization for making strategic decisions and furthermore, it is use to include private data of individuals. It has to be assured, specially focusing on information confidentiality since final users solely will query DW's information [19]; [22]; [20]. The security aspects have been traditionally added to the final solution once the system has been built. Nevertheless, in order to improve the quality and security of any information system, it is needed to identify and incorporate security constraints from the beginning and consider them in all stages of the development process [9]; [17].

On the other hand, DWs and OLAP applications can be developed by following a Model Driven approach by using different models in the development process, separating the system functionality from details of specific technologies and implementations. This approach allows us to define transformations which are able to automatically generate the intermediate models and the final implementation, saving then on development costs and efforts. The different development stages of a DW be aligned with the different models of a Model Driven Architecture [16]: business models for system's requirements (Computational Independent Model, CIM); conceptual models (Platform Independent Model, PIM); and logical models focused on a concrete technology (Platform Specific Model, PSM).

There are contributions on the development of secure information systems which although they are not focused on DWs and OLAP propose interesting ideas. For instance, UMLSec [14]; [15] which uses UML to define and evaluate security specifications using formal semantics, or Model Driven Security (MDS) [2]; [3] which uses the MDA approach to include security properties in high-level system models and to automatically generate secure system architectures. On the other hand, it can be found other proposals that take into account the specific structural and security aspects of DWs. In this area, solely Priebe and Pernul propose a complete methodology for develop secure DWs [19], but neither establishes the connection between levels in order to allow automatic transformations nor deals with reverse engineering.

Reverse engineering is very useful in the development of information systems, since it allows us to analyze legacy systems and to obtain their models at a higher abstraction level. Thus, to apply reverse engineering provides us a mechanism for re-documentation, model migration, restructuring, maintenance or improvement, tentative requirements, integration, conversion of legacy data. The model obtained by applying a reverse engineering process are easier to understand than the implementation of the legacy system and can be used into a modernization process in which we can modify systems' characteristics into the models whereas modifying the implementation. For instance, new aspects not considered into the initial development, such as security, could be added [18]; [6].

Although data reverse engineering field has been widely studied in literature [1]; [4];[7]; [13], there is little research on reengineering of DWs and OLAP applications and there are no approaches that consider security and apply a model driven approach to automate the process.

This paper defines a reverse engineering process for legacy OLAP applications that considers both structural and security aspects. This proposal has been included in a previously defined architecture for developing secure DWs and OLAP applications [10]. Then, the contribution of this paper is the definition of this reverse engineering process that is composed of two stages: the generation of logical models from legacy OLAP implementations (considering SQL Server Analysis Services (SSAS) as the source OLAP tool); and the generation of the conceptual model corresponding to the logical model. In this way, legacy OLAP applications can be re-documented and improved with security by modifying the conceptual model obtained. Then, the improved system can be automatically re-implemented or migrated to other platforms by using our model driven architecture. As a contribution of this paper the transformations needed for automatically obtain conceptual models from legacy OLAP applications have been implemented.

This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 will briefly describe our previously defined architecture for developing secure DWs and OLAP applications; Section 3 will present the reverse engineering process proposed in this paper; Section 4 will show an application example to validate our proposal; and Section 5 will finally present our conclusions and future work.

## 2 Our Model Driven Architecture for Secure OLAP Applications

This section briefly describes the different layers of our architecture for developing secure DWs and OLAP applications. This architecture has been aligned with an MDA architecture [10] providing security models at different abstraction levels (CIM, PIM, PSM) and automatic transformations between models (Figure 1) We have defined in previous works security models for each development stage of the secure DW and OLAP application.



Fig. 1. Model Driven Architecture for Secure OLAP applications.

For the requirement stage (business level (CIM)) a UML profile allows us to define security requirements associated to the DW. This profile has been [21] based on the  $i^*$  framework [23] Then, for the conceptual modeling stage (PIM), another UML profile called SECDW [12] allows us to achieve the multidimensional modeling of the structural aspects of the DW (facts, dimensions, bases, hierarchies, attributes, etc.) within its security constraints defined by using an Access Control and Audit (ACA) model focused on DW confidentiality [11].

In order to achieve the multidimensional modeling at the logical level (PSM) a metamodel called SECMDDW focused on the OLAP technology has been defined [5]. It extends the Common Warehouse Metamodel [8] to permit the inclusion of security constraints and incorporates all the details needed for a further implementation of the system into a OLAP tool.

The development process has been also automated by defining sets of transformations between models (defining QVT rules) and towards the final secure implementation of the OLAP application (defining MOFScript rules). In this way we have consider SQL Server Analysis Services (SSAS) as the target OLAP tool.

In this paper we complete this architecture by defining the transformations needed to automate a reverse engineering process. That is, the generation of the logical model corresponding to a legacy implementation and the transformation from logical to conceptual models.

## 3 A Reverse Engineering Process for Legacy OLAP Applications

This section describes the reverse engineering process proposed in this paper (Figure 2). This process has been integrated with our MDA architecture for developing secure

DWs and OLAP applications (defined in previous works). That is, it uses the models that have been defined for the different development stages and includes the transformations needed to obtain the conceptual model corresponding to legacy OLAP implementation. This process is composed of two stages: (1) the transformation of the legacy OLAP implementation into a logical model and (2) the transformation of the logical model into a conceptual model.




Fig. 2. A reverse engineering process for legacy OLAP applications.

### 3.1 Obtaining Logical Models

Firstly, the legacy OLAP implementation has to be analyzed in order to detect the structural and security aspects of the OLAP application and generate its corresponding logical model.

There are a great amount of OLAP platforms such as the solutions identified in Gartner's Magic Quadrant for business intelligence and analytics platforms ([www.gartner.com](http://www.gartner.com)): Microsoft, Oracle, IBM, Microstrategy, Pentaho, Jaspersoft, etc. In this work, we have considered that the legacy OLAP application has been implemented into one of the platforms identified in the leaders quadrant, Microsoft SQL Server Analysis Services (SSAS).

The majority of OLAP tools represent the structural and security information as metainformation stored in XML files: cubes, dimensions, attributes, measures, hierarchies, roles, security permissions, etc. Nevertheless, each OLAP tool uses its own syntax and thus has to be specifically processed. In this case, SSAS organizes OLAP metainformation in three kind of files:

- (i) Cube files: cube, measure groups, related dimensions, classification hierarchies and security permissions established over the cube or its measures.
- (ii) Dimension files: dimension, attributes, hierarchies, aggregation levels and security permissions over the dimension or its attributes.
- (iii) Role files, that represent the access control policy by using an RBAC strategy. These roles are used in the definition of security permissions.

For this stage we have implemented a parser which receives these three kind of XML files as input, processes them by using XPath expressions and generates its corresponding logical model according to our logical metamodel. This transformation also processes the information in order to improve the target logical model, for instance by grouping information that can be represented in the model together.


### 3.2 Obtaining Conceptual Models

In a second stage, the logical model previously generated is transformed into a conceptual model. In order to achieve this goal a set of QVT transformations has been defined and integrated into our MDA architecture.

Logical models are more concrete than conceptual models, for instance, our logical model is focused on OLAP and manages concepts related with this concrete technology. On the other hand, conceptual models are richer in expressiveness and contain information independent of the platform used.

When we define a reverse engineering process, we have to take into account that the logical model does not include enough information “independent of the platform” for rebuild all the aspects of the conceptual model. Then, in some occasions there are different choices for transforming certain elements and we have to decide the best one. In order to automate the entire process these special situations have been analyzed and some heuristics have been implemented inside the transformations.

Figure 3 shows the main elements of the transformation defined, called SECMDW2SECDW. It is composed for several QVT relations grouped by its purpose into relations for roles, cubes and dimensions.



**Fig. 3.** A reverse engineering process for legacy OLAP applications.

The first group generates the roles needed to represent the security configuration in the conceptual model. Then, cubes are processed by several relations. A top relation “Cube2SFact” serves from the remainder auxiliary rules for defining both the structural and the security aspects related with cubes (generating facts, attributes, security constraints, etc.).

Finally, dimensions are processed by using a top relation “Dimension2SDimension” and auxiliary rules for the structural and security aspects related (generating dimensions, bases, hierarchies, security constraints, etc.).

Next, two relations related with dimensions are described as examples. The first one, called “Hierarchy2SBase” (shown in Figure 4), is related with structural aspects. It analyses the classification hierarchies (Hierarchy) associated with each dimension (ownedHierarchies), and for each one creates in the conceptual model a base class (SBase) associated with the dimension implied (SDimension). It represents a classification hierarchy composed of one aggregation level and then, the “Level2ChilBase” is called in order to add the remainder aggregation levels of the hierarchy.




Fig. 4. Hierarchy2SBase relation.




Fig. 5. DimensionMemberPermission2SConstraint relation.

Another example related with security constraints is shown in Figure 5. The relation “DimensionMemberPermission2SConstraint” processes security permissions defined over dimension attributes (MemberPermission) and transforms them into security information attached to the attribute in the conceptual model. In this case, the source security information can be transformed into four different security elements that represent different kinds of security rules. Depending of the information included in the source element will be better to generate one or other kind of security rule. The heuristic needed to automatically choose the best target element has been implemented in the where clause of the relation and depending on the source characteristics calls the auxiliary relations needed to create the target element.

## 4 Application Example

This section shows our proposal applied to a legacy OLAP application implemented into SSAS. The DW used as example is focused on analyzing sales according to different perspectives (products, dates, customers and stores) and also considers several security constraints. This example uses three user roles that represent security levels with different privileges (from higher to lower privileges): secret “SLS”, confidential “SLC” and undefined “SLU”.

Due to space constraints, this example has been conceived to describe how a piece of the system has been transformed from its implementation to the conceptual model (the dimension “Product”).

Table 1 shows a piece of code of the legacy OLAP application for the sales DW used as example. It corresponds with the XML file for the dimension “Product” and shows some security permissions associated with the dimension “Product” and its attributes. Each security permission affects to a certain user role defined with the tag “RoleID”.

Firstly, the parser developed analyses the meta-information described in XML files and generates the logical model. Figure 6 partially shows the logical model obtained, focusing on the structural aspects related with dimensions. It can be observed how a schema, a cube for “Sales” and several dimensions “Customer, Product, Date and Store” have been defined within their attributes and hierarchies. The information needed to define these elements has been extracted from a great number of legacy XML files (one per each cube, dimension or role) and grouped in the same model.

Figure 7 shows the elements generated in the logical model for the security information related with “Product” dimension, that was presented in Table 1. Our parser has generated a dimension permission for each user role. The permission for the role “SLS” grants access to the entire dimension. Nevertheless, the permission for the role “SLC” denies access to certain products labeled as anonymous deliveries. Finally, the security permission for the role “SLU” represents the information of Table 1. It denies access to the dimension “Product” but grants access to product information grouped by category (ID and description) by defining permissions over attributes. The logical models corresponding with the other dimensions have been omitted.

Next, the QVT transformation defined is applied to the logical model in order to automatically generate the conceptual model. Figure 8 shows the model obtained. At a first look, it can be observed how the conceptual model is smaller and easier to understand and to modify than the logical model, and than the implementation.

Now we can easily understand how our example is composed of a central fact “Sale” (secure fact class) with measures “amount” and “quantity”, which can be classified by using different dimensions “Product”, “Store”, “Date” and “Customer” (secure dimension classes). Furthermore, different aggregation levels have been defined for “Products” which can be grouped by “Category” and for “Customers” which can be grouped by “City”.

On the other hand, security constraints have been established over multidimensional elements. Firstly, the security privileges needed to access fact, dimension and base classes are defined (as tagged values): a security level of “C” is required to access “Product”, “Store” and “Customer” dimensions; and a level of “U” for the fact “Sale”, dimension “Date” and bases “Category” and “City”.

Moreover, several security rules complement the model. The security constraints defined in Table 1 for the dimension “Product” were represented as several security permissions in the logical model and finally are represented in the conceptual model as a security rule attached to the dimension “Product”. This security rule shows all products to the role “SLS”, hides anonymous deliveries to the role “SLC” and hides information about all products for the role “SLU”, although role “SLU” can access this information grouped by category (as indicates the tagged value added to the base




“Category”). On the other hand, an authorization rule (AUR) attached to “Customer” allows each user to access its own customer’s information (although user’s security privilege was lower than the required one for “Customer”, that is “SLC”).


**Table 1.** SSAS implementation.

```

<Dimension>
<ID>Product</ID>
<Name>Product</Name>
<!--Structural aspects have been omitted-->
<DimensionPermissions>
<!--Dimension Permissions for SLS and SLC have been omitted-->
<DimensionPermission>
<ID>DimensionPermissionSLU</ID>
<Name>DimensionPermissionSLU</Name>
<RoleID>SLU</RoleID>
<Process>true</Process>
<Read>Allowed</Read>
<AllowedSet></AllowedSet>
<DeniedSet>[Product]</DeniedSet>
<AttributePermissions>
<AttributePermission>
<AttributeID>CategorycategoryID</AttributeID>
<AllowedSet>[Product],[CategorycategoryID]</AllowedSet>
<DeniedSet></DeniedSet>
</AttributePermission>
<AttributePermission>
<AttributeID>CategorycategoryDesc</AttributeID>
<AllowedSet>[Product],[CategorycategoryDesc]</AllowedSet>
<DeniedSet></DeniedSet>
</AttributePermission>
</AttributePermissions>
</DimensionPermission>
</DimensionPermissions>
</Dimension>
    
```



**Fig. 6.** Logical Model (PSM). Dimensions’ structure.



**Fig. 7.** Logical Model (PSM). Product dimension’s security rules.




Fig. 8. PIM model.

## 5 Conclusions

The reverse engineering process presented in this paper allows us to automatically obtain conceptual models from legacy OLAP applications. In order to achieve this goal we have developed: (i) a parser to analyze the legacy OLAP applications' metadata and to generate the corresponding logical model for OLAP; and (ii) we have defined a set of QVT transformations to obtain conceptual models independent of the platform from logical models focused on the OLAP technology.

These models are useful for redocument existing applications and improve OLAP applications modifying the models obtained. Another contribution of our proposal is that the reverse engineering process also considers security aspects. That is, if the legacy system has security constraints defined, these are extracted and represented in the conceptual model. And once the conceptual model has been obtained, it can be used to incorporate or to modify the security configuration. Finally, the implementation for the modified conceptual model can be automatically obtained by using our model driven architecture (by applying the set of transformation rules defined in previous works for automatically generating secure OLAP code from conceptual models).

In future work we plan to deal with more OLAP tools (such as Pentaho) and different technologies (such as NoSQL). In this way, once the conceptual model for a legacy system has been obtained, we would like to offer different targets to migrate the improved systems.

## Acknowledgements

This research is part of the following projects: SERENIDAD (PEIII11-037-7035) financed by the "Viceconsejería de Ciencia y Tecnología de la Junta de Comunidades de Castilla- La Mancha" (Spain) and FEDER, and SIGMA-CC (TIN2012-36904) and GEODAS (TIN2012-37493-C03-01) financed by the "Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad" (Spain).

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